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Regulatory policy in telecommunications is desperately in need of midlevel theory. There is widespread consensus that regulators should try to
promote competition, but there is also bitter contention about what this implies for particular industry contest. As one industry observer stated,
"Competition should be the policy. And code that
enables competition should be the rule."1 But this
same observer also argued that the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") should regulate and require AT&T to allow customers to
choose the internet service provider ("ISP") that
furnishes service over AT&T's cable facilities. 2 A
pro-competition policy based solely on the premise that competition is good is fundamentally
flawed, since it advocates a competition policy
without analysis of the different structural possibilities for competition. Hence, "competition"
becomes merely a rhetorical device. Policymakers
must not considerjust the costs of promoting competition, but also the profound implications on
the industiy structure. This is true regardless of
whether the policy to be considered is mandating
sub-loop unbundling, requiring line-sharing or
allowing the use of unbundled network elements
("UNEs") for the provision of leased lines.
Regulators must make strategic choices among
different structural possibilities that will promote
competition. 3 The common view that deregula-

tion should occur once competition has developed is not a good framework for policy. Unlike
antitrust policy, which acts to restore suppressed
competition, pro-competitive regulation in a historically monopolized industry has to assess the
merits of promoting new, different and often incompatible dimensions of competition. 4 Waiting
for competition to emerge before deregulating
fosters the illusion that the existing regulation
structure has no effect on the form and extent of
the competition that later develops. Regulatory
decisions must be based on an extensive consideration of the way the proposed regulations will
later shape competition. Regulators, while staying
alert, humble and flexible, need to ponder what
feasible regulatory policies would bring about the
most beneficial development in industry structure.
This article attempts to expand the discussion
of this crucial question and forwards three propositions:
(1) Structural problems are constraining beneficial
developments for internet services and voice telephony.
The challenges of defining meaningful products and establishing value-based interconnection
relationships for internet services are slowing the
development of new services that require different billing protocols, qualities of service and reliability. In voice telephony, pro-competitive regula-
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tion that does not adequately consider the costs
and benefits of promoting different forms of competition may perpetuate costly, complex regulatory battles, and limit the scope for commercially
driven business reorganization and service innovation.
(2)'Development of competing, independently owned
service interconnectionpoints ("SIPs ")will stimulate development of local facilities and wide-area services.
The development of SIPs would enable the separation of two different spheres of activity in telecommunications networking and stimulate more
dynamic, decentralized industry growth. Telecommunications networking at its most abstract level
can be separated into two activities. First, the connection of end-users to the network depends
heavily on idiosyncratic, location-specific knowledge and equipment. In contrast, the second, the
provision of network services, is almost inherently
nonlocation specific, and relies upon standardized routines and equipment. Thus, independent
businesses that interconnect these disparate activities would not only stimulate competition for the
provision of both end-user connectivity and network services, but also for the SIPs themselves.
(3) Regulation of voice service interconnectionshould
promote competing, independently owned SIPs.
Regulation should promote competing, independently owned SIPs by giving them the opportunity to have a privileged position for terminating voice calls. Existing regulatory authority and
practice largely shape interconnection for voice
telephony. While data traffic is growing much
more rapidly than voice traffic, the value and
bandwidth of voice traffic is still sufficient to influence strongly the overall structure of network in5 The Telecommunications Act of 1996 requires incumbent local exchange carriers ("incumbent LECs") to provide
interconnection at any technically feasible point within their
networks. See 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(2)(b) (1999 & Supp. It
1997). To implement other requirements of the 1996 Act,
the FCC has required incumbent LEC interconnection and
network elements to be priced based on the forward-looking
cost of the most efficient current network technology
deployed within the structure of the incumbent LEC's wire
centers (offices). See In re Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 15449, 15844-56, paras.
672-703 (1996). The FCC's TELRIC rules make the price of
interconnection rates and network elements dependent on
the incumbent LEC's geographic structure of its wire centers.
See id. at para. 683. The Commission of the European Communities has recommended maximum prices for local, single-transit and double-transit interconnection, i.e. intercon-
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terconnection. Preferential treatment for SIPs
would stimulate competition for voice-telephony
call termination within the current regulatory and
industry structure.
These propositions suggest that feasible
changes in the regulation of voice telephony interconnection would result in a much more competitive structure for the industry. Regulation thus
far has treated telephony interconnection architecture from the perspective of technical feasibility and requests from particular competitors.
Moreover, telephony interconnection regulations
have almost exclusively been defined in terms of
5
the incumbent operator's facilities and offices.
Given the enduring economic importance of interconnection architecture, a broader perspective
should be considered. 6 The development of competing, independently owned SIPs would provide
an industry structure conducive to better regulatory policy and more dynamic, decentralized industry growth.

I.

STRUCTURAL LIMITATIONS TO THE
INTERNET

A worrisome aspect of the current structure of
internet services is that retail customers often
have little idea of what they are actually buying.
This is a recurring topic on internet user discussion lists: "I bought a TI high-speed connection to
the internet. How do I make sure that I'm getting
the full service of the Ti?" Deceptively simple, this
query actually combines the customers two connectivity concerns: bandwidth and quality of ser7
vice. When buying leased lines, such as a TI, customers are purchasing dedicated bandwidth
nection defined in terms of the hierarchy of the particular
company's telephony network. See 98/195/EC: Commission
Recommendation of 8January 1998 on interconnection in a liberalised telecommunications market, Official Journal L. 228, 30-34,

Aug. 15, 1998.

6 The Peruvian regulator, OSIPTEL, has required the incumbent Peruvian operator, Telefonica del Peru, to provide
at least one interconnection point in each of Peru's 24 departments. Thus OSIPTEL has made a choice about the-geographic structure, but not the ownership or competitive
structure, of interconnection points with Telefonica. See

Legislacion en Telecomunicaciones, Decreto Supremo No 020-98-

MTC, para. 39 (visited Apr. 10, 2000) <www.osiptel.gob.pe/
marleg/cont/leg/leg/1998/ds2-98-mtc.htm>.
7 Leased lines are well-defined, established products, but

they have low average bandwidth utilization and high network management costs.
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between the customer's premises and the customer's ISP. When a customer purchases a TI
from an ISP, the customer typically gets a "Ti's
worth" of dedicated bandwidth from the customer to the ISP. But the physical connection is
not the only attribute that the customer values;
the customer also desires the particular connectivity services transported over the connection; and
the customer expects particular quality, reliability
and billing features in conjunction with those services.
Quality of service, reliability and billing:
transactional, not technical challenges

A.

ISPs currently face large challenges in attempting to differentiate their infrastructure-based services to customers based on quality of service, reliability and the availability of billing options. The
unstructured and dynamic nature of interconnection on the internet itself makes establishing new
types of infrastructure-based services difficult. The
long and tortuous discussions about "upgrading
the internet" from IPv4 to IPv6 illustrates the nature of the challenges. Lower-profile examples of
infrastructure development problems include
small but annoying and persisting incompatibilities in e-mail formats, the handling of extended
ASCII characters and the treatment of e-mail attachments. The major weakness in the current
structure of the internet services industry is that
customers who need services not available using
current, generic internet connectivity must incur
high transaction costs because they must establish
a variety of different forms of service-level agreements, such as virtual private networks and customized peering arrangements.
Looking at transactions between ISPs, some industry observers and participants have voiced concern that prevailing peering (interconnection)
practices impede the internet's development at
the wholesale level. As one noted in early 1998,
"the extant non-policy peering policy [is] the biggest threat to the future of a competitive internet." One recent article declared:
Contrary to popular belief, the biggest impediment to a
better, faster [i]nternet isn't technological. It's politiJack Rickard, Editor's Notes, BOARDWATCH, May 1998, at
6 <www.boardwatch.internet.com/mag/98/may/bwm1.
html>.
9 Robin Gareiss, Tech Tutorial, Old Boys' Network, DATA
8

CoMM., Oct. 7, 1999 (visited Apr. 6, 2000) <www.data.com/

cal. The [i]nternet is composed of about 8,000 smaller
networks, and there are no rules (or laws) defining how
they're connected. As a result, ISPs engage in lengthy,
closed-door debates trying to determine how to connect, who should pay more, and how upgrades will be
handled.9

Lack of mutual understanding and acceptance
of peering terms has led to disputes about traffic
routing, traffic balances and arrangements for international interconnection.' 0
These disputes over peering illustrate the
problems posed in trying to allocate service value
rationally among networks that are interconnected without an established service structure.
For example, suppose that network A has many
customers that it charges for internet access and
network B hosts several servers that provide information over the internet. Network A passes server
queries to network B, and network B returns the
requested data to network A. The question is how
to determine what each of these two networks
owes the other for'network services. Suppose that
network B sends many more packets into network
A than it receives. It can be proposed that network B should owe network A for the value of the
interconnection. However, on the other hand,
network A's customers, who pay for internet service only to network A, requested the information
from network B, so perhaps network A should pay
for the value of the transport of the information
from network B. Note also that the content providers who hire network B to host their content
may have advertisers who want network A's sub:
scribers to see their advertisements, and may also
be collecting content subscription fees from network A's access customers. Clearly, even this simplified market structure model provides little guidance as to how to rationally divide service value
between networks. It is not surprising that negotiations over internet service interconnection are
contentious.
Two additional factors further confound attempts to rationally allocate interconnection service value. First, the networks that participate in
supplying a particulai service are not predefined.
The provision of a particular service for any particular end-user on a given network may involve
network traffic traversing two or more other netissu/99100/peering.htm>.
10

See Geoff Huston, Interconnection, Peering and Settlements

(visited Apr. 1, 2000) <www.isoc.org/inet99/proceedings/
le/le_l.htm> (discussing internet interconnection).
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works ad hoc, since the networks involved in routing the data can change rapidly in response to
changes in overall network traffic patterns. Second, interconnection between networks is typically not negotiated on a service-specific basis but
instead assessed in terms of packet transport because the internet is a platform for the provision
of a wide variety of services. Thus, the simple form
that packet-based peering agreements currently
take constrains transaction costs within an industry structure, but does not offer any guidance for
the rational allocating interconnection service
value because they obscure the economic signals
relevant to interconnection service value.
The difficulty that ISPs experience differentiating infrastructure services for their retail customers is directly related to the problem of allocating
interconnection service value. Considered from
the perspective of market supply, the poorly developed and differentiated market for interconnection services constrains the development of retail products that use interconnection services.
From a demand perspective, the economic transactions that define the current internet industry
structure generate only highly attenuated transmissions of consumer value to agents making relevant network investment decisions. The current
industry structure, therefore, discourages competition and instead provides a strong impetus to
consolidation because services provided end-toend within one company's network face none of
the transactional challenges outlined above.
Without structural change in the internet, small
ISPs will have few or no opportunities to preserve
and develop their businesses other than continually bargaining with a few large network operators. Current regulatory policy, then, fosters
neither a dynamic industry nor decentralized innovation. Instead, small ISPs are likely to struggle
to ensure their survival through political means.
As an example, consider approximately 1,400
small, independent local telephone companies in
the U.S., which benefit from special regulatory
treatment. These companies have effectively or-
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ganized themselves through associations such as
the National Exchange Carriers Association
("NECA"), the National Telephone Cooperative
Association ("NTCA") and the Organization for
the Preservation and Advancement of Small Telephone Companies ("OPASTCO"). Under Sections 3(37)(B) and (C) of the Telecommunications Act of 1934 ("the Act" or "the
Communications Act"),'' rural telephone companies are defined as any telephone company that is
sufficiently small enough to meet the criteria
under the Act, irrespective of where they are located.12 Rural telephone companies are extended
3
special regulatory and universal service benefits.'
B.

Public policy for internet infrastructure:
"don't change anything"

Public policy for internet infrastructure has not
responded to these increasingly serious industry
challenges. The U.S. regulatory framework for internet infrastructure was established fifteen to
twenty years ago. The governing principle for internet regulation is "don't change anything. " 1 4 An

FCC order in 1980 decided that enhanced services are not subject to common carrier regulation. 15 Internet services have been classified as enhanced services, and hence, they have not been
subject to the many regulations that govern interconnection for voice telephony. 16 Moreover,
based on a 1983 FCC decision, enhanced service
providers are treated as end-users. 17 Thus, ISPs
can purchase flat-rated end-user offerings from local telephony companies and avoid a separate set
of regulated prices, including per minute charges,
that local telephony companies apply to switched
voice telephony customers who are classified as
"telecommunications carriers."
As argued above, the challenges associated with
defining meaningful products and value-based interconnection relationships appear to be constraining the internet from developing even more
impressively than it is now. However, attempts to
address these issues directly have not been suc-

47 U.S.C § 153(37)(B)-(C) (1999 & Supp. II 1997).
See id. § 153(37)(B)-(C).

quiry), Final Decision, 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 419 (1980) [hereinaf-

12
'3
14

See, e.g., 47 U.S.C § 254 (1999 & Supp. H 1997).
E.g., FCC, OPP WORKING PAPER 31, THE FCC AND THE

I1ISee
10-12.

'I

UNREGULATION OF THE INTERNET

(authored by.lason Oxman)

(1999) [hereinafter UNREGULATION OF THE INTERNET].
15
See generally In re Amendment of Section 64.702 of the
Commission's Rules and Regulations (Second Computer In-

ter Computer I ].
UNREGULATION OF THlE INTERNET,

supra notel4, at

17 See generally In re MTS and WATS Market Structure,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 97 F.C.C.2d 682, 711-22

(1983).

20001

Transforming Network Interconnection and Transport

cessful. For example, in the summer of 1999, former FCC Chairman Reed Hundt attempted to set
up an industry forum to address internet interconnection. The forum's goal: "to stave off potential government regulation of peering by determining how large internet service providers can
fairly interconnect their networks with smaller
counterparts."1 8 The forum intended to address
"financial settlements for interconnection and
whether different charges should apply for different types of traffic." 19
Several months later, Mr. Hundt was reported
as saying:
'What I'm finding everywhere is indecision,' he
[Hundt] says. 'There's a lot of interest, but no consensus.' And that inability to find common ground is what
concerns him. His original view was that peering would
be settled in one of three ways: by a forum, market
forces, or regulation. Now that the forum route seems
not to be
working, Hundt fears that regulators might
20
step in.

A year earlier, another leading trade publication noted, "Talk of any type of government intervention, from the Justice Department or the
[FCC], scares everyone in the game." 2 ' One
might imagine that having a former Chairman of
the FCC discuss these issues would heighten interests in resolving these concerns. If anything, the
failure of this effort and others2 2 suggests that the
great difficulty in resolving internet interconnection issues can only be corrected by a change in
the regulatory and industry structure.

II.

TELEPHONY REGULATION:
PROMOTING COMPETITION WITHOUT
JUDGEMENT

Policy-makers around the world proclaim their
determination to promote telecommunications
competition. But backing this desire to promote
competition in telecommunications requires answering the question of what specific scope and
18
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data.com/story/DCM19990610S0001 .html>.
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Robin Gareiss, Tech Tutorial, Old Boys' Network, DATA
Oct. 7, 1999 (visited Apr. 2, 2000) <www.
data.com/issue/991007.html>.
21
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(visited Apr. 1, 2000) <http://www.boardwatch.com/mag/
20

COMMUNICATIONS,

98/may/bwm74.html>.

manner of competition should be promoted. Unfortunately, this "competition for what?" question
has not been adequately considered or answered.
The inability to answer this question by defining
exactly what services should be open to competition and what that competition should "look" like
has significant long-run costs: current voice telephony regulation may be unintentionally promoting an industry structure for competition that
is much less beneficial than the alternatives. In a
sense, policy-makers are flying by the seat of their
pants and holding on for dear life, hoping that
everything will turn out for the best wherever the
plane happens to land.

A. Avoiding judgements about competitive
structure
It is clear that despite the enactment of a broad
range of pro-competitive policies, telecommunications policy analysts and policy-makers are reluctant to directly consider competition from a structural perspective. Instead, policy-makers have
assumed responsibility for promoting competition
for everything, everywhere. There is seldom any
consideration of whether competition in any
given industry segment is feasible or even desirable, although regulators are generally pledged to
protect consumers from any unfortunate effects
3 The policy concept of "competiof competition. 2tive neutrality" appears to mean that the regulator, while promoting competition for everything,
must ensure that regulation does not promote
one type of competition more than another. Such
rhetoric, while incoherent, emphasizes that regulatory considerations of competitive structure are
preparations for exercising regulatory discretion.
Regulatory discretion is considered an undesirable and unnecessary aspect of sound pro-competitive policy.
22 See, e.g., Brokered Private Peering Group, BOARDWATCH,
May 1998 (visited Apr. 1, 2000) <http://www.boardwatch.
com/mag/98/may/bwm29.html>.
23 Others have analyzed whether more competition in
U.S. long-distance services is an appropriate policy goal. See
Douglas Galbi, The Price of Telecom Competition: Counting the
Cost of Advertising and Promotion, I INFO 133-193 (Apr. 1999);
Douglas Galbi, RegulatingPricesfor Shifting Between Service Providers <www.ssrn.com> (forthcoming in Information Economics
and Policy).
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1. Failure of the technocratic approach
In traditional neo-classical economics and public utility theory, analyses of technology and demand provided the analytical basis for judgements about competitive structure. The key
24
phrase in this approach is "natural monopoly."
Based on estimates of the characteristics of production functions and consumer demand, the industry is partitioned into markets, and the markets are classified as either "workably competitive"
or "naturally monopolistic.

'2 5

Regulators promote

competition in markets that are "workably competitive" and continue to regulate markets that
are "naturally monopolistic."

26

Unfortunately, this approach provides limited
guidance for current pro-competitive policy.
When telephony was a radically different business
from cable service, when switching costs were not
driven by development of the computerized
switch, and when wireless telephony and the internet did not exist, economists analyzed whether
particular parts of the telephone network were a
natural monopoly. The fact that today's industry
is marked by convergence, dynamic demand and
technological change makes this traditional analysis much more difficult.
More significantly, this approach obscures central policy considerations. First, it ignores the effects of regulation on the structure of competition. Interconnection regulation might mitigate
economies of scope that would otherwise preserve
a "natural monopoly." More generally, the determination of a "workably competitive" market cannot occur prior to consideration of regulation.
Second, the time frame of the development of
competition should be a key regulatory concern.
For example, a "workably competitive" market for
facilities-based broadband connectivity to resi24
Herbert Hovenkamp,
31-36 (1985).

ECONOMICS AND ANTITRUST LAw

Herbert Hovenkamp, FEDERAL ANTTRUST POLICY: THE
LAW OF COMPETITION AND PRACrICE § 15 (1994).
26 Id. at § 19.2a. The author thanks Mr. Tim Brennan,
25

who provided substantive comment for this paragraph.
27 See generally Charles D. Cosson, You Say You Want a
Revolution? Fact and Fiction RegardingBroadband CMRS and Local Competition, 7 COMMLAW CONSPEcTus 233 (1999) (critiqu-
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dences might develop over a time span that is too
long to deliver benefits comparable to the imposition of a loop unbundling requirement on the incumbent telephony provider.
The technocratic approach largely fails to inform current telecommunications policy. Policymakers now generally ignore the technocratic approach to making judgements about competitive
structure, not because of its weaknesses, but because they now largely attempt to avoid making
judgements about competitive structure. A determination to promote competition everywhere in
the telecommunications industry might be taken
to imply the judgement that there are no natural
monopolies in the industry. But policy-makers
have not made that judgement.
2. Focus on incumbent monopolists' products and
networks
Pro-competitive policy attempts to avoid makingjudgements about competitive structure by assuming that the incumbent monopolists' products
and network elements define the realm of relevant competitive possibilities. The results of this
crude reasoning leads to flawed conclusions that
competition will lower prices but will not alter the
industry or marketplace structure, or that an
emerging technology, such as wireless communications service, will evolve to be the exact replacement of the incumbent services. In the case of
wireless, this reasoning would invite the conclusion that wireless and wireline local exchange ser27
vices were equivalent substitutes for each other.
An example of a more sophisticated application
of this reasoning is the FCC's attempt to establish
policies and rules for competition in switched
voice transport to incumbent end-offices.2 8 The
distance services from the Regional Bell Operating Companies' ("RBOCs") local exchange services, industry developments led MCI and Sprint to build independent national networks that could effectively substitute AT&T's long-distance

voice services. See United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co.,
552 F. Supp. 131 (D. D.C. 1982). The MFJ placed a constraint
on the further expansion of competition down into the
RBOCs' local exchange networks. Under the MFJ, the

charge regime for interconnection between local exchange

RBOCs were required through Sept. 1, 1991 to charge an
equal amount per minute for all switched voice traffic
originated and terminated for interexchange carriers (the
"equal charge" rule). See id. at 233-34. Thus, for switched

carriers and long-distance carriers in order to promote long-

voice traffic, interexchange carriers had no incentive to inter-

distance voice competition. Further encouraged by the Modified Final Judgement ("MFJ") that separated AT&T's long

connect with RBOCs at end offices rather than at tandems.
See id. at 199. Competition for RBOCs' interoffice switched

ing latter view).
28 In 1980, for example, the FCC designed an access
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recent policies focused on extensive unbundling
of the incumbents' network elements. These policies implicitly sanction the view that competition
will develop for elements of the incumbents' networks, if competition develops at all. Twisted to
another level, a recent paper implicitly proposes
that unbundling should not be imposed to enable
competitors to provide products that the incum29
bent operator does not provide.

3.

The rise of the client-driven approach

Regulators also avoid considering the impact of
industry structure on competition by taking a client-driven approach when formulating pro-competitive regulatory policy. For example, Company
B, a competitive local exchange carrier ("competitive LEC"), argues that the regulator must require
incumbent carrier, Company A, to do X so that
Company B can provide service Y. In this scenario,
Company A would be typically described as a monopolist, and X would be deemed as essential to
the provision of Y. Moreover, service Y is a highly
desired service by many end-users because it will
be better or lower-priced than the current alternative. Responding to Company B's request, the regulator requires Company A to do X in the interest
of promoting competition. However, the regulator does not require Company B to actually provide
Y, nor does the regulator require Company B to
provide Y at a better or lower price than the identified
alternative because doing so would be considered
"intrusive" regulation. The disadvantages of this
voice transport was economically impossible. See In re Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, First Report and Order, 11 FCC
Rcd. 15499, 15508-09, paras. 11-12 (1996).
After the expiration of the MFJ's equal charge nile, the
FCC established new rules to foster the development of competition for transport between the incumbent network operators' offices. See In re Transport Rate Structure and Pricing,
Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 6
FCC Rcd. 5341 (1991). The FCC abolished the equal charge
rule and established a more complicated rate structure with a
lower effective interconnection rate for end-office interconnection. See id. at 5344-48, paras. 15-36. In a series of transport restructuring orders beginning in Oct. 1992, the Commission required local exchange carriers to offer interoffice
transport on a flat-rated, unbundled basis. See In re Transport
Rate Structure and Pricing, Report and Order and FurtherNotice
of Proposed Rulemaking, 7 FCC Rcd. 7006, 7007-8, paras. 1-2
(1992). Around the same time period, the Commission issued a series of orders also requiring large local exchange
operators to offer collocation for interconnection for leased
lines and switched voice services at any local or tandem ex-

ad hoc approach are clear. The scope and nature
of the competition actually promoted by the regulation is highly dependant upon the nature of requested regulatory action and the regulator's response to this request. Further, the development
of competition is dependant upon what companies actually do with the regulatory rights and advantages that they gain.
The Telecommunications Act of 199630 sup-

ports this approach, but it does not require it. Section 251(c) (3)31 of the Act identifies duties of incumbent LECs to provide access to network
elements in response to requests from telecommunications carriers seeking to provide telecommunications services. Section 251(d) (2)32 gives
the FCC the responsibility for defining the scope
of these duties. Under Section 251 (d) (2) (B),3- an

"impair" limitation on access duties is set out in
the context of a telecommunications carrier
"seeking access to provide the services that it seeks
to offer." However, the "necessary" limitation on
access duties in Section 251 (d) (2) (A) 34 is not put
in this context. One might imagine a form of access that is necessary to provide a telecommunications service that a telecommunications carrier
seeks to offer, but that is not necessary to promote
a pro-competitive, deregulatory strategy for the industry. Moreover, Section 251(d) (2)

35

sets out

minimum access standards that the FCC must
consider. 36 Additional access standards associated
with a broader vision for pro-competitive, deregulatory industry development appear to be permissible, but they have not been explored.
change for which they received a bonafide request for collocation. See In re Expanded Interconnection with Local Telephone Company Facilities, Second Report and Order, 8 FCC
Rcd. 7374, 7402-16, paras. 45-69 (1993). These rules envisioned flat-rated, facilities-based competition between incum-

bent operators' local exchange and tandem offices, and their
primary objective was to drive down interconnection costs for
long-distance switched voice telephony. See id. at 7376, para.

I.
29 See generallyJerry A. Hausman and J. Gregory Sidak, A
Consumer-Welfare Approach to the Mandatory Unbundling of Telecommunications Networks, 109 YALE L.J. 417 (1999) (proposing
new standards for mandated unbundling of network elements by ILECs).
30

Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104,

110 Stat. 56 (codified at scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
'31 47 U.S.C. § 251 (c) (3) (1994 & Supp. IV 1997).
32 47 U.S.C. § 251 (d) (2) (1994 & Supp. IV 1997).

33 Id.at. § 251 (d) (2) (B).
4 Id. at. § 251 (d) (2) (A).
35 Id.at. § 251 (d) (2).
36

See id. at § 251(d) (2).
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B.

Unintentional aspects of emerging industry
structure

Although policy-makers have been preoccupied
with the extent of competition and its speed of
development, industry performance also depends
on other aspects of competitive structure. Even in
a communications industry in which all product
markets are workably competitive, at least two
sorts of potential weaknesses could exist. First, the
industry, although competitive, might not be capable of re-organizing itself quickly to adjust to
changes in the technology or the scope of potential trades. Second, the industry, although competitive, might dissipate significant economic
value as companies continually appeal to the regulator to decide narrow, complex issues concerning the distribution of value between companies.
Aspects of pro-competitive regulatory policies for
voice telephony may be contributing to the development of such weaknesses.
Current pro-competitive regulatory policies for
voice telephony are increasing the cost of adjusting a geographic structure of incumbent end-offices that could be highly inefficient. The geographic structure of incumbent telephone
operators' end-offices was largely established
prior to 1917. Given subsequent dramatic developments in switching and transport technology,
this structure is likely to be highly inefficient. Procompetitive regulation, however, is now deeply
connected to the existing structure of incumbents' networks. Such regulations have partitioned incumbents' networks into elements defined in terms of incumbents' existing end-offices.
Regulated rates for interconnection have been defined in terms of tandem and end-office hierarchies. Competitors have been granted regulatory
rights to collocate in incumbent end-offices.
Given such regulations, changes in the structure
37
The New York Public Service Commission ("NY PSC")
required virtual collocation for private line service in 1989
and physical collocation for switched services in 1992. See generally In re Application by Bell Atlantic New York for Authorization Under Section 271 of the Communications Act to Provide In-Region, InterLATA Service in the State of New York,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 15 FCC Rcd. 3953 (1999)
(detailing and citing New York PSC orders).
38
Initially, the FCC required physical collocation. See In
re Expanded Interconnection with Local Telephone Company Facilities; Amendment of the Part 69 Allocation of General Support Facility Costs, Report and Order and Notice of Pro-
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of incumbents' network are likely to occur much
more slowly.
Moreover, collocation rules have created narrow, complex and enduring regulatory battles between companies. State regulatory commissions in
the U.S. began to require collocation in incumbents' offices as early as 1989. 3 7 The FCC began to
establish national collocation rules in 1992.38 Yet
companies are still battling intensely over narrow
issues that affect the value of collocation obligations. For example, a 1999 FCC order decided,
among other issues, that collocating carriers are
allowed to construct their own facilities for crossconnecting among themselves; and that incumbent LECs must provide "shared collocation,"
"cageless collocation," and collocation in adjacent
controlled environments if collocation space is exhausted. 9 The FCC also issued the following requirement:
[A] n incumbent LEC that denies collocation of a competitor's equipment, citing safety concerns, must provide to the competitive LEC within five business days a
list of all equipment that the incumbent LEC locates
within the premises in question, together with an affidavit attesting that all of that equipment meets or exceeds
contends
the safety standard that the incumbent LEC
40
the competitor's equipment fails to meet.

A large number of other issues, at this level of
detail, are emerging with respect to loop-sharing,
managing interference among loops ("cross
talk"), sub-loop unbundling, and the use of various combinations of wholesale network services or
elements.
Attempts to implement unbundled access to
the incumbents' network have quickly led to the
recognition that information systems for pre-ordering, ordering, provisioning, repair, maintenance and billing ("OSS") determine the usefulness of the access gained to the physical facilities.
Regulators must not only regulate access to the
network physical plant, but also deal with issues

posed Rulemaking, 7 FCC Rcd. 7369, para. 1 (1992). This
requirement was overturned in court, so the FCC enacted a
virtual collocation requirement. See Bell Atlantic Tel. Co. v.
FCC, 24 F.3d 1441 (D.C. Cir. 1994). The Telecommunications Act of 1996 gave the FCC authority to require physical
collocation. See 47 U.S.C. § 251 (c) (6) (1999 & Supp. II
1997).
'I See generally Deployment of Wireline Service Offering
Advanced Telecommunications Capability, First Report and Order and FurtherNotice of Proposed Rulemaking, 14 FCC Rcd. 4761

(1999).
40

Id. at para. 36.
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relating to the incumbent carrier's information
systems capabilities and performance. The regulatory fight between incumbent and competitive
carriers moves from argument over actual physical access to the network, to a dispute over the
ease of access to the mandated unbundled elements. For example, both the parties and FCC
noted that competitive carriers using BellSouth's
network must scroll through lists of products and
services to fulfill particular customer orders. 4' By
contrast, BellSouth's own retail interface allows its
customer service representatives to find a product
or service simply by typing the first few letters of
the product's name. 42 A recent independent test
done for regulatory purposes of Bell Atlantic's
OSS in New York State involved statistics for 855
test elements. 43 But such tests have merely established a level of incumbent LEC performance and
did not determine the ease of access.
The development of detailed regulation and litigation over the access to a network operators' information systems will likely come at a high cost.
While technology is rapidly driving down the cost
of switching and transport hardware, 44 the most
important challenge to competition is to foster a
wider range of network management capabilities
and to promote quicker, more customized service. 45 Any regulation requiring an incumbent
network operator to provide nondiscriminatory
access to its OSS could diminish the incumbent's
incentives to improve its OSS.46 There is nothing
that would indicate that subjecting OSS systems to
the litigation and the adversarial process would
not make improvements to the incumbent's systems more risky and problematic.
In regulated industries, companies and custom-

ers tend to acquire quasi-property rights in existing arrangements. Thus, as companies and customers make plans and investments based on the
wide range of regulatory rights being established
for telephony, the existing regulatory structure
becomes entrenched and the possibility of deregulation in the future narrows. The regulator
then would be called upon by the market participants to continually police the value of acquired
rights. Emerging market opportunities, however,
may gradually erode the value of rights acquired
under telephony regulation and result in a market-driven, decentralized deregulation. For example, a telecommunications carrier has obtained
the right to do "x" for price "pl." If subsequent
market development results in "x" being freely offered for price p2, which is less than the original
price pl, then the communication carriers original regulatory right has become far less valuable
to it and will be "liquidated." This "liquidation"
would also occur if a more cost-effective opportunity than "x" emerges or if for some other reason
"x" is no longer a useful right.
However, this liquidation of regulatory rights
will inevitably follow from industry growth and the
development of competition. For example, if incumbent LECs' end-offices become key network
interconnection points, then collocation rights
may endure long beyond the growth of competitive telecommunications networks. Regulated
rights associated with complex information systems like OSS are likely to be difficult to liquidate
because of the momentum of idiosyncratic investments necessary to establish compatible software
and business practices. Thus, policy-makers and
industry participants need to consider the possi-

See Application of BellSouth Corporation to Provide
In-Region, InterLATA Services in South Carolina, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 13 FCC Rcd. 539, 634, para. 174
(1997).
42 See id.
43 See Common Carrier Action; Federal Commission Authorizes Bell Atlantic to Provide Long Distance Service in
New York, Report No. CC 99-60, CC Dkt. No. 99-295 (rel.
Dec. 22, 1999).
44
In 1998, software accounted for 40% of capital spending for MCI WorldCom, while switching and transport accounted for 6% and 19%, respectively. In contrast, in 1988
software accounted for 3% of MCI's capital spending, while
switching and transported accounted for 19% and 44%, respectively. MCI WorldCom expects that switching and transport will amount to less than 25% of capital spending per
year within a few years. John Sidgmore, MCI WorldCom Vice
Chairman, presentation to stock analysts (Spring 1999). ,
45 In 1998, MCI WorldCom's cost for delivering one min-

ute of voice traffic broke down as follows: OSS, 5%; switching, 3%; transport, 4%; operating costs, 26%; and access (interconnection fees), 62%. John Sidgmore, MCI WorldCom
Vice Chairman, presentation to stock analysts (Spring 1999).
46
Under the Section 271 requirements of the 1996 Act,
for OSS functions that are analogous to those operations that
a BOC provides to itself, its customers or its affiliates, the
nondiscrimination standard requires the BOC to offer requesting carriers access that is equivalent in terms of quality,
accuracy and timeliness. The BOC must provide access that
permits competing carriers to perform these functions in
"substantially the same time and manner" as the BOC. In
re
Application by Bell Atlantic-NY for Authorization to Provide
In-Region, InterLATA Services in South Carolina, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 13 FCC Rcd. 539, 593, para. 85 (1997)
[hereinafter Bell Atlantic Application]. Such regulation lessens
the competitive value to the RBOC of investing to improve its
OSS.

41
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ble significance of what economists call "hysteresis" or "lock-in" effects. 47 Indeed, the parties

themselves may encourage rapid growth of grandfather clauses to perpetuate the effects of legacy
regulations long beyond the relevance of the policy concerns that motivated them. Competition
will occur, but only in the context of regulations
that hinder industry change and foster wasteful
regulatory battles.
III.

MAKING JUDGMENTS ABOUT
PROPITIOUS INDUSTRY STRUCTURE

Careful analysis and industry observation can
provide a basis for making useful judgments
about industry structure. The intention is not to
forecast the future, even less to provide a comprehensive development plan for the industry. The
objective is to identify key economic distinctions
that appear to be relatively stable, explore their
implications for beneficial industry development
and look for nascent industry trends that may provide a foundation for promoting such development.
A.

Economic Analysis
Connecting end-users to a telecommunications

network is a local business. 48 Constructing these

connections requires careful consideration of local topology and economic geography. Constructing these connections also requires careful consideration of local regulations and politics;
wireline network operators need to secure extensive rights-of-way from local governments and
wireless operators need to place antennae. Moreover, in the U.S. in 1990, approximately 28% of
all housing units were multiple dwelling units,
and the share of such units is significantly higher
in other countries.4 9 To gain access to end-users,
network operators often have to enter into highly
location-specific, idiosyncratic negotiations with
47
C.f Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services,
504 U.S. 451, 474-76 (1992) (recognizing. that a "lock-in" effect is created when customers encounter high costs to switch
suppliers).
48
George Ford, formerly of the Competition Division of
the FCC's Office of General Counsel and now at MCI
WorldCom, has emphasized this point to me in discussions of
industry economics.
49
See Promotion of Competitive Networks in Local Telecommunications Markets, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and
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the owners of buildings, campuses and managed
housing tracts. National regulation can play a role
in addressing these challenging issues, and the
FCC has been actively considering a variety of
questions and regulations. 50 Nonetheless, no national regulations are likely to be able to transform end-user connections into a standardized,
nationally negotiated and managed service.
In contrast, providing network services is inherently a nonlocal business relying on standardized
routines and infrastructure capabilities. The ubiquity of e-mail services depends on addressing,
routing and formatting standards. Requesting and
serving web pages requires additional widely implemented standards. The nature of such standards is largely independent of local knowledge
and infrastructure, and the service provided is not
related to any geographical location. Customers
do not necessarily care where Amazon.com's servers are physically located. For products that it can
deliver in electronic form, Amazon.com does not
necessarily care where its customers are physically
located either. 5' Moreover, Amazon.com can expand its capacity to deliver electronic products to
customers simply by installing additional standardized hardware. 52 Stock market valuations for
companies such as Amazon.com have soared
largely because their business models readily scale
to global commerce.
Dividing customer value between local connectivity and wide-area network services is a fundamental economic problem. While no amount of
head-scratching and eye-gouging can resolve this
issue, industry performance will depend heavily
on the quality of the arrangements that are
worked out. The most important resource for
working out such arrangements is relevant information. The best way to generate such information is to have customers choose among different
combinations of local connectivity and wide-area
network services.

Notice of Further Inquiry and Third Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 14 FCC Rcd. 12673, 12681, para. 29 (1999).
50
See id. at 12674-83, paras. 1-17; see also In re Telecommunications Services Inside Wiring, Report and Order and Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 13 FCC Rcd. 3569
(1997).
51
A supporting electronic payment infrastructure, such
as that for credit cards, is also necessary.
52
To the extent that customer support requires human
interaction, this is an additional cost factor in scaling service.
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Institutional Implications

The above economic analysis suggests that good
industry performance is likely to depend on the
presence of businesses that provide effective separation of local connectivity from wide-area network services. I will refer to businesses that serve
this function as service interconnection points
("SIPs"). SIPs would compete locally in coordinating wide-area network services for local end-users.
An SIP would lease local facilities providing connectivity to end-users and would host and interconnect to facilities distributing wide-area network services. To mediate effectively between
local connectivity and wide-area network services
within a relevant geographic location, an SIP
should not be owned by either a local facilities
provider or wide-area network service provider.
This allows a local facilities provider in one area
to own an SIP in an area in which the local provider does not provide local facilities. Similarly, a
wide-area network service provider could own an
SIP, as long as that SIP is not connected directly
to other SIPs using the wide-area network service
provider's facilities.
Competing, independently owned SIPs would
effectively define the product and the value proposition for local facilities builders. The product
for local facilities builders would be connectivity
from end-users to SIPs; thus, this connectivity
could be defined in terms of the types of attributes currently used to define end-to-end connectivity for leased lines. Competition among SIPs
would allow the value of wide-area services to be
transmitted to agents considering investments in
local facilities. The higher the value to end-users
of the wide-area services, the greater the amount
SIPs would be willing to pay local facilities investors to connect end-users to the SIP. By helping to
define a local product and value proposition for
53

See

MILTON MUELLER,

TION, INTERCONNECTION,

UNIVERSAL SERVICE; COMPETIAND MONOPOLY IN THE MAKING OF

THE AMERCAN TELEPHONE
54 See id. at Chapter 6.
55
See id. at 148.

SYs. 40 (1997).

See id. at 146-49.
57
In 1917, there were 19,550 local exchange offices in
the U.S. See id at 147. In 1998, local exchange carriers reported a total of 18,700 local exchange switches to the FCC.
See 1998 Statistics of Common Carriers, at Table 2.10 (visited
Apr. 7, 2000) <http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common . ./
Fcc-StateLink/SOCC/scc98idx.html>. The Oct. 1999 LERG
lists 22,860 distinct office codes for incumbent LECs, of
which about 4,300 appear to be multiple references to listed
56

connectivity, SIPs would foster investment in local
facilities.
Enabling localization of investment in communications facilities played a key role in the development of rural telephony. The U. S. Managers of
the Bell System, which held Alexander Graham
Bell's original telephone patents, believed that
telephone service was primarily of value to business users in major cities. In 1894, after seventeen
years of commercial activity, the Bell System had
installed nearly 90% of its phones for business
subscribers. 5 3 Independent, locally financed commercial telephone companies, community-oriented mutual companies and farmers' cooperatives brought telephony to small agricultural cities
and rural areas. 5 4 By 1920, 38.7% of American
farms had telephone service, whereas only 30% of
American households did.5 5 Historical conditions

fostered decentralized investment in local access
facilities, which allowed telephone service to cover
all of the

U.S.56

The geographic structure of local

exchanges that was established prior to 1917 still
essentially defines the current geographic structure for current U. S. interconnection regulation. 57 A set of competing, independently owned
SIPs could recreate incentives for decentralized
investment in local access facilities.
SIPs also would facilitate low-cost wide-area
bandwidth transactions. Some industry participants foresee commodity markets emerging for
bandwidth. 58 Such markets could help provide appropriate signals for wide-area network investment and lessen the cost of rolling out new widearea services. 59 The development of such a market
will depend on establishing a widely recognized
set of nodes among which bandwidth can be
traded. SIPs could serve effectively as nodes for a
bandwidth market.
A well-developed layer of competing SIPs would
U S West offices.
58

Enron has made the most extensive public proposal to

date. See Enron Broadband Services (visited Apr. 7, 2000)
<http://www.ec.enron.com/bandwidth/>. Companies active

in bandwidth brokerage and trading include Arbinet (visited
Apr. 7, 2000) <hwww.arbinet.com>; Band-X (visited Apr. 7,
2000) <http://www.band-x.com>; and RateXchange (visited
Apr. 7, 2000) <www.ratexchange.com>.
59 The development of such a market should not be
taken for granted. Attempts to establish commodity markets
have historically had a high failure rate even among products
with propitious characteristics. See generally D. G. Black, Success and Failure of Futures Contracts: Theory and Empirical Evidence (1986).
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provide a lattice upon which new wide-area network-services could be implemented. The largest
share of value in wide-area networks is likely to be
associated with noncommoditized characteristics
such as interconnection services, physical circuit
diversity and reliability, and pricing and protocol
options. 60 By providing a lattice for implementing
such services, SIPs would eliminate the need
among competing wide-area networks for a new
mode of interconnection in order to provide a
new service ubiquitously. Such a lattice would
lessen the importance of various forms of peering
among wide-area networks and hence decrease industry tensions associated with internet interconnection.
Recent Industry Developments and
Institutional Possibilities

C.

SIP-like institutions are already beginning to
emerge in the communications industry. One is
PAIX, which began operating in 1996 as a center
in California for exchanging traffic among ISPs. 61
PAIX states that it is carrier-neutral, not owned by
2
a telco or carrier, and not affiliated with any ISP.6
PAIX has announced plans to open six additional
highly secure facilities for collocation and interconnection among ISPs in the U.S. within a
year.6 3 Another company offering SIP-like institutions is Equinix, founded in 1998. Equinix builds
and operates carrier-neutral and content-provider-neutral facilities it calls "Internet Business
Exchanges" ("IBXs"). 64 Equinix offers to network
facilities providers, content providers and applications service providers a set of buildings with fi60
Historically the heterogeneity of user needs spurred
the development of private networks. See David Gable, Private
Telecommunications Networks: An Historical Perspective, PUBLIC
NETWORKS, PUBLIC OBjECTIvS 35-49 (Eli Noam and Aine
Nishuilleabhain eds., 1996) <www.vii.org/papers/citi509.
htm>.
61 The PAIX center in Palo Alto, Cal., was set up by Digital Equipment Corp. Currently it is a subsidiary of Metropolitan Fiber Network, a seller of dark fiber connectivity. See Paix,
Paix's Neutral Internet Exchange Model and Proven Track-Record
Propels Growth to 100 Customers (visited Apr.7, 2000) <www.
paix.net/press-releases/2000-0105-paixl00customers-new.
htm>.
62

See id.

The locations for the facilities are Tyson's Corner, Va.;
Atlanta, Ga.; Dallas, Tex.; Los Angeles, Ca.; and an additional
facility in Palo Alto, Ca. See Paix, Paix Announces Major Expansion Plans (visited Apr. 7, 2000) <www.paix.net/press-releases/I 02699-paix-expansionnew.hti>.
64
Unless otherwise noted, the information on Equinix
63
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nancial grade security, redundant power supplies,
private and shared collocation areas, and a wide
range of options for interconnecting within the
building. Equinix currently has one IBX operational in the Washington, D.C. area and recently
signed a $1.2 billion contract for constructing
more than 30 additional IBXs in business, finan65
cial and internet hubs around the world.
Some real estate companies are beginning to
provide SIP-like institutions. The Rudin family,
developers and owners of one of New York's largest privately owned commercial and residential
real estate portfolios, is a prime example. 66 They
developed and own the New York Information
Technology Center at 55 Broad Street, Manhattan, which houses a large number of communications and new-media companies, and have established similar facilities at 110 Wall Street and at
the former Grumman Aircraft factory on Long Island. The Rudin family also recently bought a former AT&T Long Lines switching center at 32 Avenue of the Americas in Manhattan, which will be
renovated and called the New York Global Connectivity Center and will house network transport
providers, web-hosting companies, Internet companies and switch companies. This facility also will
provide extensive support for in-building interconnectivity.
Most of the SIP-like institutions described above
are located in major cities and do not provide services to end-users. In residential and rural areas,
ISPs moving to offer their end-users a variety of
network services may evolve into SIPs. Dial-up Internet connectivity has become for ISPs a low-margin, commodity service that cannot sustain their
given here is from Equinix's website. See generally, Equinix
<http://www.equinix.com>.
65 According to CNET News, in May 1999, the CEO of
Equinix, Al Avery, indicated that Equinix planned to build 15
IBXs domestically. See Ben Heskitt, Start-up aims to house Net
data exchanges, CNETNews.com (May 25, 1999).
66 The subsequent information is from press releases at
<www.55broadst.Com> and Ken Branson, AT& T Sells Former
Long Lines Building for Telco Hotel, PHONE+, Dec. 16, 1999
<www.phoneplusmag.com> SIP-like institutions are generally
called "telco hotels" in the trade press. See generally Ken Branson, No Vacancy, Telco Hotels Can't Go Up Fast Enough, XCHANGE

MAGAZINE,

Apr. 1999 <www.x-changemag.com>;

Jonathan Marshall, Telco Hotels Fill Up Fast, S. F. CHRONICLE,
Jul. 2, 1998 <www.boradlink.com/press/colomotion.html>.

Other nontelecom companies that offer or own collocation
services include: Colomotion <www.colomotion.com>; Hudson Telegraph Associates; Switch and Data Facilities Corp.
<www.switchfacilities.com>; Taconic Investors; Telecom Real
Estate Service; and Telehouse <www.telehouse.com>.
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businesses. ISPs are thus seeking to develop valueadded businesses, such as web hosting, video-conferencing, e-commerce and a variety of other
wide-area network services. An impediment to the
ISPs ability to offer their customers new services is
the lack of competition in local telephony in residential and rural areas. However, as ISPs assemble
increasingly appealing offerings of network services, they will generate strong incentives for the
entry of local facilities providers who can connect
end-users to these services. Given that numerous
ISPs provide local service in almost all regions of
the U.S.,67 they could be important to the devel-

opment of competing, independently owned SIPs
that cover all of the U.S.
IV. A FEASIBLE POLICY LEVER FOR
IMPROVING INDUSTRY STRUCTURE
Changes in voice telephony regulation to promote the development of SIPs could help overcome the structural weaknesses that are appearing in internet and telephony competition. In
particular, voice telephony regulation could seek
to establish a geographically comprehensive lattice of competing, independently owned and certified SIPs. Becoming a certified SIP would involve
gaining a privileged position for voice telephony
call termination in exchange for adhering to certain ownership restrictions. All telephony service
providers in defined SIP regions would be required by regulation to provide zero-price call
(circuit-switched voice, fax and dial-up modem)
termination for calls delivered to chosen certified
SIPs in the SIP region associated with the called
customer. The owner of a certified SIP would not
be allowed to own facilities for local connectivity
in the area in which the certified SIP is located. A
certified SIP would also not be allowed to own
network facilities connecting to other certified
SIPs.

One issue is the geographic areas associated with
SIPs' voice termination roles and transport facility
ownership restrictions. In the U.S., a natural
choice is LATAs. Each state regulatory commission might certify, for a fixed term of five years,
three to five independently owned SIPs in each
LATA in the state, with all local telephony operators in the state having responsibility to terminate
calls from at least two of those SIPs. Since there
are 236 LATAs covering the U.S., such a program
would lead to roughly 750-1000 certified SIPs
spread throughout the U.S. If all voice traffic, including local calls, passed through these SIPs,
they would have to support 1.9-2.5 Gbps of voice
traffic. 68 This is about the volume of peak data
bandwidth through a major U.S. internet interconnection point in late October 1999.69
There is a range of institutional possibilities for
facilities and ownership of SIPs. Independently
owned internet or private network interconnection points might be candidates to be certified
SIPs. Highly capable ISPs meeting the transport
facility ownership restrictions might also be candidates to be certified SIPs. National network operators, many of whom are building large data centers, might be willing to divest transport facilities
to some data centers in order to make them candidates to be certified SIPs. 7 0 In addition, regula-

tors or antitrust authorities could consider requiring large incumbent LECs to divest some tandem
switching offices so as to create an interconnection structure more conducive to controlling in7
cumbent LEC market power. '
A.

Considerations of policy feasibility

Changing voice telephony regulation is a much
more propitious policy direction for influencing
evolving industry structure than is establishing
new regulations for internet peering. Large incumbent LECs are widely recognized to have mar-

Further necessary decisions about certified SIPs

ket power in providing local telephony. In con-

would depend on institutional circumstances.

trast, market structures for internet services are

See NBER WORKING PAPER No. W6453, UNIVERSAL SERTHE COMMERCIALIZATION AND GEOGRAPHY OF U. S. INTERNET AccESS (authored by Shane Greenstein) (March 1998) <www.nber.org>.
(8
Calculation based on total voice bandwidth given in
Table 1. Voice calls among incumbent telephony customers
would not necessarily pass across SIPs.
69
Based on bandwidth for MAE East <208.234.102.97/
MAE/east.aggr.overlay.html>.

70 AT&T, UUNet, PSINet, Qwest and Intel are talking
about building about 25 new data centers each this year. See
Kate Gerwig, Saving Future Services, TELE.COM, Jan. 10, 2000
(visited Apr. 10, 2000) <www.teledotcom.com>. Level 3 has

67

VICE IN THE DIGITAL AGE:

also built more than 25 data centers that offer a wide range
of services to collocating customers.
71
Large incumbent LECs might, in fact, find it advantageous, from the perspective of transforming industry struc-

ture

and maximizing asset value, to

do this.
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highly dynamic, and market power arguments
with respect to internet services typically depend
significantly on speculation about future developments. While there is widespread, deeply rooted
hostility toward changing the regulatory framework for internet services, telephony regulation
over time has gone through a series a major new
regulatory initiatives. Associated with that history
is the FCC's extensive knowledge and experience
with implementing telephony regulation. There is
no similar knowledge and experience with respect
to regulating internet interconnection. Moreover,
there is significant dissatisfaction with the current
state of telephony regulation, and the Telecommunications Act of 1996 gives the FCC broad forbearance authority with respect to almost all of its
regulations. Changes in voice telephony regulation that promote SIPs could be accompanied
with a dramatic reduction in a wide range of
other regulations that would no longer be part of
this new implementation of a pro-competitive,
deregulatory national policy framework for the industry.
While data traffic is growing much more rapidly
than voice traffic, the value and magnitude of
voice traffic is still sufficient to influence strongly
the overall structure of network interconnection.
The first data column of Table 1 shows total
RBOC interoffice bandwidth in use. Subsequent
data columns show the total bandwidth required
for RBOC originated voice calls in different cate-

gories. Assuming that all local voice traffic travels
between RBOC local exchanges, the total
bandwidth of RBOC interoffice facilities in use for
nonvoice services in 1998 was 2.4 times greater
than bandwidth needed for voice services. Most of
the nonvoice bandwidth is for leased-line services,
whose bandwidth has been growing about 40%
per year since 1989.72 Internet bandwidth in mid1998 was probably about 110Gbps and it is grow-

Despite the significant growth of private networks,

On the other hand, Coffman and Odlyzko's figure for private
line and public data networks, 370 Gpbs at year-end 1997,
appears to be a significant underestimate.
74
Convergent Networks, a company that focuses on
voice networks, stated that AT& T's network carries 850 ter-

72

there has been relatively little analysis of them. For an informed perspective late in the 1980s, see Donald A. Dunnand
and M. Gens Johnson, Demand for Data Communication, IEEE

NETWORK (May 1989). Dunn and Johnson foresaw the widearea interconnection of computer networks that created the
internet. They estimated that data revenue was growing 23%
per year in 1988, and anticipated that data revenue would

account for more than half of common carrier revenues in
1997. In 1997, according to the FCC SOCC Table 2.9, data

revenue accounted for about 6% of local exchange carriers
common carrier revenue. Based on data in AT&T's 1998 Annual Report, I estimate that about 20% of AT&T's revenue is

data revenue.
73 See K. G. Coffman, and A. M. Odlyzko, The Size and
Growth Rate of the Internet (visited Apr. 10, 2000) <http://www.
research.att.com/-amo> (estimating the effective bandwidth
of the internet core at 75Gbps at year-end 1997). They also
estimate that, with the exception of a sport in 1995 and 19964

the trend growth rate of core internet bandwidth is 100% per
year. See id. Coffman and Odlyzko estimate U.S. long-distance
voice bandwidth at 350Gbps at year-end 1997. See id. Since
RBOCs account for about 70% of U.S. local access lines, the
Coffman-Odlyzko long-distance voice bandwidth figure is
roughly in accord with the interLATA toll figures in Table 5.

ing about 100% per year.7 3 The most important

point to take from Table 1 is that voice services
still account for an important share of network
bandwidth, although within a few years voice
bandwidth will be insignificant.7 4 This means that
becoming a distinguished interconnection point
for voice telephone can play an important role in
giving an interconnection point industry salience.
75
Some consideration of costs and benefits

B.

A requirement that all local telephony providers in a defined geographic area provide zeroprice call termination from at least two certified
SIPs in the area has relatively small costs and large
benefits. This requirement promotes the concentration of network traffic at certified SIPs and thus
helps to promote SIPs' industry significance in future network development. This requirement also
provides an administratively simple telephony interconnection regime that would allow network
operators to provide flat-rated telephone service.

abytes of voice traffic per day as compared to 33 terabytes of
data traffic. See Om Malik, Telecom Titans, FORBES.COM, Sept.
8, 1999 (visited Apr. 10, 2000) <www.forbes.com/tool/html/
99/sep/0908/feat.htm> (reporting comments of Bing Yang,
chief technology officer and cofounder of Convergent Technologies). The specific nature of these measurements is unclear. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that utilization rates for
long-distance switched voice circuits (33%) are almost an order of magnitude greater than utilization rates for data circuits (3-5%). See Andrew Odlyzko, The Internet and other networks: Utilization rates and their implications, AT&T LabsResearch, Sept. 12, 1998 (visited Apr. 10, 2000) <wwwresearch.att.com/-amo>. The interoffice bandwidth data in Ta-

ble 5 refers to the bandwidth of circuits in use, not the volume of traffic passing through those circuits.
75

For further discussion of questions and objections see

Douglas Galbi, TransformingNetwork Interconnection and Transport: Policy Direction Summary <www.ssrn.com>, and forthcom-

ing in

INFO.
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Transforming Network Interconnection and Transport

Table 1
RBOC Bandwidth in Use (in Gbps)
interoffice bandwidth

interLATA toll

intraLATA toll

Local

total voice

1998

6,291

217

54

1,602

1,874

1997

4,128

221

61

1,540

1,822

1996

3,376

206

58

1,501

1,766

1995

2,762

194

66

1,456

1,716

1994

1,654

172

65

1,396

1,633

1993

1,304

156

64

1,340

1,560

1992

934

142

64

1,299

1,505

1991

729

135

66

1,256

1,457

1990

493

133

56

1,217

1,407

1989

346

157

55

1,174

1,386

Notes: Interoffice bandwidth calculated based on data in RBOC price cap annual filings. Telephony bandwidth based on FCC SOCC call
volumes, estimated call times and 9000 minutes/month/per 64 Kbps circuit.

It would eliminate major battles such as those that
have occurred in the U.S. over reciprocal compensation for switched circuit minutes associated
with dial-up internet connections.
Competition in local telephony by itself will
shift more voice traffic into interoffice networks.
Traditionally, local exchange offices were designed around local calling communities so that
local calls could be completed without the need
for interoffice transport. When neighbors are
connected to competing local telephone companies, local calls require interoffice transport.7 6 As
the figures in Table 1 suggest, because local call
volumes are high relative to intraLATA and interLATA toll calling, competitors shifting even a
small share of an incumbent LEC's local call
bandwidth to interoffice transport can result in a
large percentage increase in interoffice voice
77
transport.
In a competitive industry, reducing interconnection management costs is probably more important than reducing the demand for interoffice
voice transport. Given the magnitude of total interoffice bandwidth, doubling or tripling the
amount of interoffice voice transport would not

require a major re-dimensioning of the over-all
network. On the other hand, managing interconnection involves exchanging traffic predictions at
each interconnection point and coordinating the
installation and maintenance of new interfacing
bandwidth. Such processes are administratively
complex, error-prone and not subject to rapid
technological improvements like those driving
down bandwidth and switching costs. Nonetheless, industry experience thus far shows incumbents often seeking to require competitors to interconnect with them at a relatively large number
78
of local offices.
New local telephony providers terminate calls
to their customers from relatively few publicly advertised offices. Consider Table 2, which documents some aspects of telephony network structure in the greater New York City metro area
(LATA 132). The first data column in Table 2
gives the number of rate centers served. Rate centers are a historically determined geographic partition of an area: the number of rate centers
served is a rough index of the scope of a telephony provider's coverage. The second data column
of Table 2 shows offices advertised in the Local

76
To lower their customers' phone bills for dial-up internet access, some ISPs have sought to become "virtual
neighbors" of their customers. They do this by acquiring a
number for each local calling area for which they provide

and Network Designfor an Incumbent Operator-TheAustrian Example, presented at 17th Annual ICFC Conference, Denver,
Col. Uune 16, 1999).
78
Bell Atlantic-New York asked the New York Public Service Commission ("NY PSC") to require that interconnecting

dial-up internet access and having their communications pro-

vider terminate all these numbers to the same physical point.
One result is that the incumbent operator sees more local
call minutes traveling through its interconnection trunks.
77 For a discussion of this problem in Austria, see generally Merka Martin, Manfred Nussbaumer and Ernst-Olay
Ruhle, The Influence of Interconnection Demand on Traffic Flows

LECs establish a geographically relevant interconnection
point ("GRIP") in every rate center that the LEC serves, unless the interconnecting carriers negotiate alternative arrangements. See NYPSC, Case 99-C-0529, Opinion No. 99-10,

pp. 48, 62-3 (Aug. 26, 1999) (rejecting the use of GRIP).
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Exchange Routing Guide ("LERG") as delivery
7

points for calls to the provider's customers.

9

New

tion of a relatively few, large incumbent offices.
Policy that requires voice telephony call termination from certified SIPs represents a dramatic
change only in the sense that it shifts voice telephony interconnection to a nonadversarial environment, i.e. competing, independently owned SIPs.

local telephony providers cover a significantly
larger number of rate centers per call delivery
point than does Bell Atlantic. This suggests that
new local telephony providers are not seeking to
economize on transport costs by having telephony
providers deliver calls to them close to their end
V. CONCLUSION
customers.
The time and cost of establishing points of presPolicy analysts and policy-makers should conence is not hindering the ability of new local tesider the merits of different competitive struclephony providers to establish more termination
tures in the telecommunications industry. Significant weaknesses in industry structure are
points for calls to their customers. Through July
1999, Bell Atlantic-NY ("BA") had provided 750
apparent in the internet and in the development
physical collocation arrangements in 175 central
of local telephony competition. Pro-competitive
8
0
offices. Of these collocation arrangements, 137
regulation for voice telephony is not adequately
are in the greater New York City area (LATA
considering over-all industry structure; instead, it
132).81 Nonetheless, as Table 2 shows, new telephappears to be largely driven by particular, narrow
requests for pro-competitive interventions. Noneony providers are using only 13 collocations in BA
theless, voice telephony regulation will have an
offices in LATA 132 as points for collecting calls
from other networks. When such arrangements
enduring effect on industry structure even when
are used, the larger new local telephony providers
voice telephony is a relatively unimportant netuse exclusively BA tandem offices. This fact furwork service. Armed with an understanding of the
ther suggests that the geography of interconnecchallenges confronting both internet services and
tion points for terminating voice telephony has
voice telephony, such a legacy can become a tool
thus far been determined by the historical locafor improving industry performance.
Table 2
Voice Telephony Delivery Points in LATA 132
Local Telephony
Provider

Rate Centers
(a)

Delivery Points
(b)

Ratio
(a)/(b)

Bell Atlantic (wireline)

Colo's in
BA Offices

Colo's in BA
Tandems

126

167

0.8

AT&T (wireline)

50

13

3.8

3

3

MCI WorldCom

32

7

4.6

0

0

Nextlink

28

1

28.0

0

0

Allegiance

23

5

4.6

3

3

Cablevision Lightpath

20

7

2.9

0

0

RCN

20

6

3.3

4

4

American Network, Inc.

18

1

18.0

0

0

Frontier

18

5

3.6

4

4

WinStar

15

1

15.0

0

0

Level 3 Comm.

15

2

7.5

0

0

all other than BA

83

77

13

6

Note: Based on LERG data current for 10/1/99. AT&T (wireline) consolidates entries for ACC National Telecom, AT&T Local and Teleport.
MCI WorldCom consolidates entries for Brooks Fiber, MCIMetro and WorldCom.

79 The LERG is produced by the Traffic Routing Administration ("TRA"), Telcordia Technologies. The FCC has
published LERG data on carriers' counts of NXX to provide
an indication of the development of competition. See Local
Competition: August 1999, Industry Analysis Division, Common Carrier Bureau, FCC <www.fcc.gov/BtireaLIs/Common_
Carrier/Reports/FCC-StateLink/IAD/1 comp99-1 .pdf>.
80 See In re Application by New York Telephone Company

(d/b/a Bell Atlantic-New York), Bell Atlantic Communications, Inc., NYNEX Long Distance, and Bell Atlantic Global
Networks, Inc.,Joint Declarationof Paul A. Lacouture and Arthur
J Troy, para. 29.
"I Calculated based on LERG data on LATA's and wire
centers, and Bell Atlantic's list of offices where collocation
has been provided <www.bellatlantic.com/tis/bacolloc.htm>.

